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Abstract
The debate about the dynamics and potential policy responses to asset inflation has
intensified in recent years.   Some analysts, notably Borio and Lowe, have called for
‘subtle’ changes to existing monetary targeting frameworks to try to deal with the
problems of asset inflation and have attempted to developed indicators of financial
vulnerability to aid this process.   In contrast, this paper argues that the uncertainties
involved in understanding financial market developments and their potential impact on
the real economy are likely to remain too high to embolden policy makers.  The political
and institutional risks associated with policy errors are also significant.  The fundamental
premise that a liberalised financial system is based on ‘efficient’ market allocation cannot
be overlooked.  The corollary is that any serious attempt to stabilize financial market
outcomes must involve at least a partial reversal of deregulation.3
Asset Price Instability and Policy Responses: The Legacy of
Liberalisation
The problem of asset price bubbles and, more generally of instability in the
financial system, has been a matter of concern since the 1980s, but has only recently
moved to the centre of the macroeconomic policy debate. Among the events contributing
to concern about asset prices, the most notable have been the boom and bust in share
prices, particularly those of technology stocks such as ‘dotcoms’, and the subsequent
boom in house prices.  These asset price movements have been experienced, to varying
degrees, in most OECD economies, including the United States, the United Kingdom and
(in the case of housing) Australia. Earlier episodes of boom and bust have affected East
Asia, the Nordic countries, Mexico, Russia, parts of Latin America and, most notably,
Japan.
As the frequency and severity of asset price fluctuations, including putative
bubbles, has increased, there has been a corresponding increase of interest in measures
that may prevent the emergence of bubbles or to seek gradual deflation of bubbles rather
than catastrophic busts. Most attention has focused on the idea of making asset price
stability a target of monetary policy, either in its own right or as a signal of incipient
consumer price inflation. As Borio and Lowe (2003) observe, this is a relatively subtle
shift in a policy paradigm based on inflation targeting. There has also been some
consideration of a possible role for prudential policy (Schwartz 2002).
Subtle as these policy shifts may appear, they nevertheless involve a fundamental
change in thinking about the role of financial markets. In the deregulated system, the task of
allocating investment capital and consumer credit between individuals, firms and nations is
left to financial markets.  As Carmichael and Esho (2001) observe, intervention aimed at
changing asset prices and other financial market outcomes, such as ‘excessive’ credit growth,
are logically inconsistent with the ‘deregulated’ framework of monetary policy and financial4
regulation that emerged  from the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s. This
framework was based on the efficient markets hypothesis.
As Borio and Lowe (2003: p. 113) observe, framing the debate in this way ‘can
easily see it stray into almost ideological territory, unnecessarily pitching supports and
skeptics of ‘market efficiency’ against each other.’ Borio and Lowe regard this division
as a source of artificial difficulties.  In this paper, we argue on the contrary that the role
of the efficient markets hypothesis is crucial and cannot be disregarded. It follows that
the debate must have an ideological, as well as a technical character. Any serious attempt
to  stabilize  financial  market  outcomes  must  involve  at  least  a  partial  reversal  of
deregulation.
This paper is organised as follows. We begin with a brief survey of the empirical
literature on asset price bubbles and asset price volatility, with particular emphasis on
the period following financial deregulation. This is followed by a survey of the
theoretical literature on asset prices and the efficient markets hypothesis. Next, the
recent debate on possible policy responses to asset price bubbles is critically assessed.
In the main section of the paper, we develop the argument that no effective response to
asset price bubbles is feasible within the current policy framework and consider
possible alternatives. Finally, some concluding comments are offered.
Asset price bubbles and asset price volatility
Borio and Lowe (2002) present data on trends in asset markets across a range of
countries since the early 1970s, collected by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS).
Asset classes surveyed are equities, commercial and residential property, and a weighted
aggregate measure of asset prices derived from these components
Borio and Lowe discern the following trends. First, equity prices tend to lead asset
price upswings and are also the most volatile, followed, respectively, by commercial and
residential property. Second, the aggregate asset data, in particular, reveal three broad
cycles of asset inflation since the early 1970s, roughly corresponding to the early to mid-
1970s, the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, and the mid-1990s to the present. Third, the5
amplitude and length of the cycles appears to be growing, with the latest upswing being
driven mainly by equity markets.
In addition to these fluctuations in national asset markets, it is important to consider
the behaviour of exchange rates. When the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange
rates was abandoned in the early 1970s, it was expected that financial market transactions
would act to stabilise exchange rates, eliminating the periods of severe overvaluation and
undervaluation associated with fixed exchange rate regimes. In reality, the volatility of
exchange rates increased substantially following the move to floating currencies.
Growth in the volatility of asset prices has been one of a number of inter-related
developments associated with the end of financial repression which have served to
increase both the gross volume of financial transactions and average levels of net
indebtedness of households, business enterprises and governments. As the Bank of
International Settlements (BIS) argued in its 2001 Annual Report:
Financial factors have long played a role in shaping business cycles.
However, as domestic financial systems and international capital
flows have been liberalized, this role has grown. Developments in
credit and asset markets are having a more profound effect on the
dynamics of the typical business cycle than was the case a few
decades ago, and have also contributed to the increased frequency of
banking system crises (BIS 2001, p. 123).
Whilst the broad link between credit growth and asset inflation seems clear, the
exact dynamics of the relationship are still poorly understood. (Borio and Lowe 2002)
argue that because of the limited nature of the existing research we are still unable to
answer questions such as when credit growth should be considered ‘excessive’, what the
cumulative effects of credit expansions might be, or how credit booms might interact
with other financial imbalances.
On the demand side, borrowers have been eager to increase their gearing. An
important factor behind this has been price. The achievement of low inflation in many
countries in the 1980s and 1990s has seen a very substantial reduction in interest rates6
and  the  cost  of  borrowing.  Hence,  whilst  debt-income  ratios  amongst  firms  and
households have risen steeply across many countries in recent years, debt servicing ratios
and interest–income ratio have remained relatively stable. Lower interest rates have made
debt more affordable and encouraged higher borrowing. The ‘money illusion’ has also
tended to play a role in promoting higher gearing, as have the wealth effects born of
rising asset prices.
Low inflation or monetary stability is also implicated in asset inflation in another
way. Conventional wisdom holds that sharp fluctuations in inflation could destabilise the
financial system, for example, by increasing the cost of debt if inflation suddenly falls.
Similarly, high inflation tends to encourage debt-based asset acquisitions and other forms
of speculative behavior. Hence, monetary stability and financial stability have tended to
be seen as complementary. This does not, however, mean that monetary stability and
financial instability are mutually exclusive. Three of the biggest asset bubbles in the
twentieth century: America’s in the 1920 and 1990s, and Japan’s in the late 1980s,
occurred in a low inflation context. In Japan in the late 1980s, CPI inflation remained at
close to zero whilst equity prices almost tripled and commercial property in Tokyo more
than tripled. More generally, inflation in most developed countries has been low in the last
decade but financial instability has increased.
While asset price volatility is of interest in itself, the crucial issue is whether asset
price bubbles or other symptoms of financial volatility are precursors of financial and
economic crises.    Borio and Lowe 2003 propose a composite indicator based on
divergences of asset prices and credit volumes from their long-term trend. The primary
weight is placed on asset prices. They show that, over a three-year horizon, their
indicator predicts 60 per cent of crisis, with a very low rate of false positives.
Theoretical analysis of asset price bubbles
Asset prices and the efficient markets hypothesis
The crucial theoretical assumption underlying financial deregulation is the efficient
markets hypothesis. In its strongest form, the efficient markets hypothesis states that all7
relevant  information  in  any  financial  transaction  is  contained  in  the  price  of  the
associated asset and hence that markets contain the best estimate of the value of any
asset,  including  equities.  Slightly  relaxed  versions  admit  to  adjustment  lags  or
information  gaps  (of  the  kind  that  might  justify  the  work  of  professional  market
analysts), but these are seen as minor issues, with the implication being that equity
markets, for example, cannot become substantially ‘over’ or ‘under’ valued.
The existence of asset price bubbles appears to contradict the efficient markets
hypothesis, and therefore to imply a violation of the premises from which that hypothesis
is  derived,  including  rational  optimisation  by  individuals  and  the  efficiency  of
competitive markets. A large literature has arisen around attempts to prove or disprove
the claim that asset price bubbles can emerge even when markets are competitive and
economic agents act rationally.
The strongest argument in favour of the efficient markets hypothesis is that
violations of the hypothesis will allow rational speculators to make unlimited riskless
profits, or at least earn large returns without incurring a commensurate risk. This is the
central point of the defence of the hypothesis recently put forward by Malkiel (2003). If
it is valid, then the existence of even a small number of rational investors preclude the
emergence of asset price bubbles.
It is not clear, however, that rational speculators can implement the strategies
required to make this argument valid. As  Shiller (2003) observes, the only way to profit
from an observed bubble is to sell assets short, and there are numerous institutional and
psychological barriers to such a strategy. During the Internet bubble of the late 1990s,
sophisticated investors such as George Soros incurred heavy losses by short-selling
indexes such as the NASDAQ as the index value rose from 2000 in 1998 to its peak of
5000 in early 2000. Nevertheless, the decline of the index after 2001 validated the
judgements of the shortsellers.
The existence of asset price bubbles is inconsistent with the efficient markets
hypothesis. Hence, in a policy framework based on this hypothesis, it is necessary to8
accept fluctuations in asset prices as market outcomes. There may perhaps be room for
marginal interventions when asset prices seem clearly out of line with fundamentals, as
in the case of ‘dirty floats’, but there is no room for systematic intervention.
Conversely, to the extent that asset price bubbles are seen as a serious economic
problem, any feasible response must involve some return to policies of financial repression.
Such policies might include qualitative controls that restrict the allocation of credit for
investments in assets seen as subject to overpricing, and restrictions on financial innovations,
particularly where such innovations derive their supposed value from unsound speculative
arguments about asset prices.
The New Classical view
Although the existence of asset price bubbles seems obvious in the light of
historical experience, it is by no means universally accepted. The most important
challenge comes from ‘New Classical’ models, which rule out the phenomena discussed
in this paper. The central assumptions in New Classical models are that markets are
flexible, that information is close to perfect, and that markets reach equilibrium and clear
continuously. Temporary disequilibrium might arise due to some kind of exogenous
shock, but flexible markets are assumed to quickly re-equilibrate. Price movements are a
‘random walk’ generated by the arrival of new information. In such a world, the
miscalculations and erroneous valuations characterised by bubbles and crashes are
assumed  to  be  impossible.  Thus,  the  New  Classical  view  of  financial  markets  is
summarised in the various forms of the efficient markets hypothesis.
‘New Keynesian’ macroeconomics takes the New Classical model as its starting
point and seeks to modify it in ways that give rise to phenomena such as involuntary
unemployment and asset prices bubbles. The most common approach is to show that
plausible  kinds  of  microeconomic  market  failure  can  lead  to  disequilibrum
macroeconomic outcomes.
An example of this kind of market failure is when lenders have only imperfect9
information about the quality of borrowers or about the quality of their investment plans.
New Keynesian theory has been concerned to show that such market failures can arise
even when market participants are perfectly rational or nearly so. The literature on
rational bubbles is a noteworthy example.
A  more  radical  departure  from  the  New  Classical  approach  is  that  of  the
‘behavioural finance’ school, which takes as its starting point the existence of a wide
range of evidence that neither individual behavior nor the movements of asset prices are
consistent with the assumptions and predictions of the efficient markets hypothesis
(Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, R.H. 1990). The primary focus of behavioral finance
analysis has been empirical and microeconomic. At least until recently, relatively little
attention has been paid to the implications of behavioral anomalies for macroeconomic
policy or for the stability of financial systems.
Satisfactory modelling of asset price bubbles may require a mixture of behavioral
finance and new Keynesian insights. The behavioral finance literature shows that
deviations from perfect rationality are to be expected. New Keynesian models show that,
far from being corrected by market forces and rational speculations, minor deviations
from perfect rationality may be amplified into substantial failures of the efficient markets
hypothesis, such as asset price bubbles.
Although there is a reasonable theoretical basis for the claim that asset price
bubbles may emerge as a result of relatively modest deviations from the joint hypotheses
of market efficiency and investor rationality, this does not amount to a theory of bubbles.
It is not clear, for example, whether bubbles are isolated and extreme events, in which
self-fulfilling  speculative  prophecies  take  over  from  normal  processes  of  market
valuation, or whether they are merely extreme instances of the asset price volatility
associated with liberalised financial markets. Since there is strong evidence of ‘excess’
volatility even in the absence of bubbles, it is arguable that a bubble is simply the result
of a random sequence of upward movements in prices relative to underlying fundamental
values.10
The principle of Occam's Razor (do not multiply entities unnecessarily) would
favour the view that bubbles are simply the right-hand tail of a price distribution
characterised by excess volatility. On the other hand, there is good, if not very formal
evidence for the proposition that bubbles are special events, characterised by widespread
speculative mania. A typical example is the exceptional popularity in Australia at present
of TV shows about real estate speculation. (Compare the rise of networks such as
CNNfN, focusing on equity investment, during the US bubble of the 1990s.)
In formulating a more satisfactory theoretical account, it may be useful to
reconsider the work of Minsky (1982, 1986). Using an historically dynamic model,
Minsky argues that capitalist financial systems are inherently unstable because of large
swings in investor expectations that tend to occur over the course of the economic cycle.
In a trough, expectations are subdued. As the recovery gathers pace, profits rise and
balance sheets are restored. Caution remains for a period, reflecting memories of the
previous downturn. As the economy continues to grow, perhaps spurred further by
technological breakthroughs or unexpectedly high rates of growth, profits are rebuilt
and expectations of future growth begin to rise. Caution begins to recede. Increasingly,
animal spirits are stirred and banks begin lending more freely and credit expands.
Even cautious investors are encouraged to join the upward surge for fear of
forfeiting profit opportunities. Momentum builds behind what Minsky (1982) refers to
as the ‘euphoric economy’. This attracts highly-leveraged asset speculators – Minsky
calls them ‘Ponzi financiers’ – who rely on rising asset prices to service debt and who
drive the market further upwards. At some point in this cycle the financial system
becomes increasingly fragile as concerns grow about how long the boom can be
sustained. Bad news can quickly frighten investors and speculators and the herd may
quickly change direction as panic sets in. The subsequent bust phase may be prolonged
if the economy enters a severe debt deflation. Low inflation may actually help foster a
debt deflation because outstanding debts cannot be reduced over time through inflation.
Finally, the subsequent recovery is accompanied by a rebuilding of balance sheets and
other forms of financial cleansing, a process of ‘creative destruction’ that helps renew
the system and sow the seeds of a subsequent cycle.11
An important obstacle to acceptance of Minsky’s work has been the lack of
microeconomic foundations, that is, of a rigorous formal account of individual behaviour
and the markets in which individuals interact. As has been argued here, developments in
behavioral finance and New Keynesian macroeconomics have the potential to provide
these foundations.
The policy debate
The liberalized financial system in which the current debate is framed evolved over
two decades following the collapse, in the early 1970s, of the tight system of controls,
sometimes referred to as ‘financial repression’, introduced in the aftermath of World War
II. Domestic financial repression was the natural counterpart to the Bretton Woods
system of fixed exchange rates and controls on international capital movements, which
broke down in 1971.
In the deregulated framework, as it was consolidated in the 1990s, central banks
used interest rates to target stable rates of inflation and (directly or indirectly) stable rates
of output growth. Prudential regulators sought to protect bank depositors and other
consumers of financial services from unsound behaviour, such as the maintenance of
inadequate reserves, by individual financial institutions.
Although asset prices have fluctuated widely since the financial liberalisation of the
1970s, there has, until recently, been little support for intervention to stabilise asset
prices, with the partial exception of exchange rates. Since much of the relevant economic
theory predicted that speculation would ensure that asset prices remained close to
fundamental values, fluctuations in asset prices, including exchange rates were initially
seen as 'teething difficulties'. This view was taken, in particular, with respect to the
housing price boom and slump experienced in Australia, the United Kingdom and the
Nordic countries in the late 1980s. When asset price volatility persisted into the 1990s, it
was generally seen as part of the price of liberalization, more than offset by the benefits
of free capital movements. The fact that asset price volatility provides substantial profit
opportunities for participants in capital markets doubtless made this acceptance easier.12
There were some attempts to manage exchange rates on a co-operative basis in the
1980s, notably the Plaza Accord of 1985 which induced a 30 per cent depreciation of the
US dollar and helped to constrain the growth of the current account deficit in the United
States. European concerns with the destabilising effects of exchange rate fluctuations
were reflected in the adoption of the European Monetary System in 1979, and, ultimately
in the move to a single currency, the euro, in 1999.
In countries that have retained a floating exchange rate, there has been a general
increase in willingness to intervene in markets, with or without overt announcement of
the fact. Examples include the 'strong dollar' policy adopted by the United States under
the Clinton Administration and exchange rate smoothing policies of the Reserve Bank of
Australia  (Kim  and  Sheen  1999).  The  short-lived  Canadian  and  New  Zealand
experiments with the use of a Monetary Conditions Index also implied an automatic
countervailing response to exchange rate movements, though the rationale was rather
different.
At  least  until  the  mid-1990s,  however,  the  dominant  trend  was  towards
liberalisation of asset markets of all kinds. This trend was embodied in the ‘Washington
Consensus’ (Williamson 1990), in which liberalised financial markets were seen as
having a powerful and beneficent role in constraining the excesses of governments.
The rise of the Washington Consensus reflected the experience of the stabilisation
policies adopted in response to the international debt crisis of the 1980s, where attempts
by debtor governments to deal with the crisis through policies of financial repression and
import substitution were almost invariably unsuccessful. In the judgement of the main
Washington institutions dealing with the crisis (the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank and the US Treasury) countries that 'took their medicine' and liberalised
capital markets were more successful.
In the 1990s however, a series of countries with recently-liberalised financial
markets (Mexico, Russia, Argentina) experienced financial crises, most of which could13
be analysed in terms of capital market volatility. The greatest such event was the Asian
crisis of 1997-98 which affected most of the economies of East and Southeast Asia. The
Japanese bubble and bust of the 1980s and 1990s, previously seen as an isolated instance,
reflecting the exceptional nature of the Japanese economy, came increasingly to be seen
as a model for asset price booms and slumps.
In this model, the typical pattern of asset price volatility involves upswings in asset
prices leading to bubble-type over-valuation, followed by subsequent sharp corrections
and associated financial stress or collapse. We begin with the bubble phase.
Borio and Lowe (2002) and others, such as Goodhart (1995), point to one causal or
at least facilitative factor in this regard: credit growth. In most industries, as supply
increases, prices and profits are squeezed thus limiting expansion in the sector. This is
not necessarily true of the financial sector. Once under way, a credit expansion will tend
to boost output and push up asset values through leveraged acquisitions thus promoting
further credit expansion (Crockett 2001).  Upswings in asset prices have been associated
with high rates of growth in the volume of credit. There is also evidence linking credit
growth to banking crises and periods of financial stress (Bell and Pain 2000; Eichengreen
and Areta 2000).
The  main  concern  with  bubbles  arises  when  they  burst,  imposing  losses  on
investors holding the bubble assets, and potentially on the financial institutions that have
extended credit to them. Financial stress might be limited to the failure of individual
financial  institutions  which  become  overextended  during  the  boom.  Increasingly,
however, the kinds of financial distress being encountered are systemic, with many
institutions  operating  in  a  similar  mode  and  simultaneously  miscalculating  and
confronting difficulties. This implies trouble for a wide range of institutions with the
strong potential for flow-on effects in the real economy, perhaps leading to a recession or
debt  deflation.  The  costs  of  dealing  with  banking  crises  through  bailouts  and
recapitalisation during the 1990s ranged from 5 per cent to 40 per cent of GDP, with even
larger effects in terms of lost output (Macfarlane 1999: Table 1).
As a consequence of financial liberalisation, the links between the workings of the14
financial system and the health of the economy have become tighter. This connection is
heightened by increased levels of business and household debt exposure in recent years
and by the entry of pension funds and small investors to equity and property markets.
Thus far, Japan is the only developed country to have experienced a full-scale debt
deflation in the period of liberalizations. However, there is increasing concern over
parallels between the situation in the United States in the late 1920s and in the aftermath
of the 1990s bubble. Both cases were marked by large equity asset bubbles which
subsequently burst, although prospects for the US economy remain unclear in the wake
of the bubble of the late 1990s.
In this context, the policies of the US Federal Reserve and particularly its Chairman
Alan Greenspan have come under increasing criticism. The central point of criticism is
that, having warned of ‘irrational exuberance’ in 1996, Greenspan should have sought to
constrain the growth in equity prices, through tighter monetary policy or, at a minimum,
through continued warnings regarding the unsustainability of the boom. Instead, in the
eyes of critics, Greenspan effectively recanted his 1996 skepticism and become an
influential advocate of the 'new economy' thesis underlying the boom.
Greenspan has been criticised for bailing out the failed hedge fund Long Term
Capital Investment in 1998, and for subsequently giving the market the green light by
lowering interest rates and talking up the ‘new economy’ (Brenner 2002). The general
reluctance of central banks to restrain asset inflation has created the impression that
they will tacitly support a boom and try to mop up any subsequent bust, thus creating
problems  of  moral  hazard.  This  belief  was  referred  to  in  the  late  1990s  as  the
‘Greenspan put’.
If the US economy recovers strongly from the recent period of recession and slow
growth, Greenspan's hands-off approach will be (or at least be seen to be) vindicated and
concern over asset price bubbles will diminish. If however, there is a long period of weak
economic activity, similar to that following the deflation of the Japanese property bubble,
it will be necessary to consider how future asset price bubbles can be prevented or15
managed.
Policy responses to asset price inflation
Discussion of policy responses to the problems of asset price inflation has focused
on methods of preventing or controlling asset price booms. Most attention has paid to on
the role of monetary policy (that is, in the current policy regime, interest rate policy).
The first problem is that of identifying a bubble. As Greenspan (quoted in The
Economist, 25 September, 1999) observes:
If we could find a way to prevent or deflate emerging bubbles we would
be better off. Identifying a bubble in the process of inflation may be
among the most formidable challenges confronting a central bank.
The task seems difficult, but not hopeless. The existence of a bubble in Japanese
land  prices  in  the  1980s  and  US  equity  markets  in  the  1990s  was  fairly  widely
recognised, as is the current bubble in real estate in Australia and elsewhere. After
studying experiences in 34 countries since the 1960s, Borio and Lowe (2002) conclude
that a combination of rapidly growing debt and asset prices provides a reasonable guide
to troubles ahead. They suggest (2002, p. 22) a ‘slightly modified policy regime, under
which the central bank responds not only to short-term inflation pressures but also, at
least occasionally, to financial imbalances’. Under such a regime, they argue, ‘the central
bank might opt for higher interest rates than are justified on the basis of the short-term
inflation outlook’.   
If an asset bubble is identified in the process of inflation, what can be done about
it? One strand of the debate concerns the idea that the dominant approach to monetary
policy, based on targeting rates of inflation, should be modified to take account of asset
prices. Such a modification may be justified either by arguments that inflation in asset
prices is an inherently welfare-relevant component of inflation, or because inflation in
asset prices is a precursor of inflation in the prices of goods and services.  In monetary
regimes that explicitly target economic activity (as in the United States or Australia), a
further  rationale  is  that  asset  inflation  may  have  medium  term  consequences  for16
economic activity.  This was an argument recently put by Charles Bean of the Bank of
England at a 2003 Reserve Bank of Australia conference: a forward-looking, flexible
inflation targeting central bank, Bean (2003: p. 2) argues, ‘should bear in mind those
longer term consequences of asset price bubbles and financial imbalances in the setting
of current interest rates’.
The idea that price indexes should incorporate asset prices was first put
forward by Alchian and Klein (1973) and revived, in the context of the asset price bubble
debate, by Goodhart (1999, 2001). Alchian and Klein argue, in the context of a life-cycle
consumption model, that the appropriate price index for welfare purposes is a lifetime
cost of living, and that prices of assets such as houses represent the cost of a flow of
housing services that house owners will receive over the period during which they own
the house. This view has received relatively little support, primarily because the price of
assets is determined by a range of factors, including risk attitudes and expectations of
future productivity (Filardo 2000).
Central bankers and monetary economists have been more sympathetic to the idea of
taking some account of asset prices if these are seen as likely to boost spending and hence
spill over into general inflation (Bernanke and Gertler 1999; Stevens 2003). However, the
relevant dynamics are difficult to fathom and raise the levels of uncertainty surrounding
policy calculations to daunting levels; a problem which is compounded in any framework that
involves increasing the timeframe of an inflation targeting regime because of the inevitable
and rapidly increasing uncertainty involved in longer term forecasting.   These problems,
combined with the lags associated with monetary tightening raise daunting issues for
monetary authorities.  As the Reserve Bank of Australia (2003a: 53) comments:
The challenge in this regard is that the risks engendered by developments in
asset markets are most often low-probability, medium-horizon events that do
not lend themselves to easy inclusion in standard short-tem forecasts.
Another criticism of using monetary policy to fight asset inflation has been the
standard argument that a policy with a single instrument, in this case short-term interest17
rates, should be directed towards a single target, most commonly CPI inflation. Ideally a
second instrument, such as fiscal policy, would be used to stabilise aggregate output. In
the absence of effective fiscal policy, the target–instrument framework leads to the
adoption of approaches such as the Taylor rule, where the aim is to minimise a weighted
sum of deviations from target rates of inflation and output growth. In this analytical
framework, the introduction of additional targets is likely to lead to a blurring of the
policy focus. Indeed, it was this problem that the inflation targeting regimes of the 1990s
were partly designed to overcome. In the absence of clear evidence that asset price
inflation leads to future CPI inflation, tinkering with the CPI measure of inflation raises
the danger of adopting a multi-objective policy without explicit acknowledgement of the
fact.
A  further  criticism  focuses  on  the  weaknesses  of  interest  rate  policy  as  an
instrument for moderating asset price inflation. Greenspan (2002) argues that interest rate
policy is a blunt instrument and that the link between interest rates and asset prices is
uncertain. Raising interest rates amidst the euphoria of a boom may have little effect.
Greenspan cites the series of US rate rises of 1989, 1994 and 1999, all of which did
nothing to stem the market. A small rate rise might even backfire if it worked simply to
re-assure investors about the inflation outlook and hence spur greater optimism about the
future. A large increase might work, but an increase big enough to pop an exuberant
bubble could have a major negative impact on the wider economy.  Greenspan (2002) is
emphatic:
It seems reasonable to generalise from our recent experience that no low-
risk, low cost, incremental policy tightening exists that can reliably deflate
a bubble.  But is there policy that can limit the size of a bubble and, hence,
its destructive fall out?  From the evidence to date, the answer appears to
be no.
Dealing with asset inflation also raises an important political problem for central
banks. Credit availability and asset booms are popular and provide a sense of opportunity
and economic well-being. In these circumstances any policy intervention that produces a18
slowdown in activity is likely to be unpopular. In the event that a misjudged policy
response produced a recession, the political consequences are likely to be far more severe
than in the converse case of allowing a boom to run on excessively.
The problems seem particularly severe with respect to the use of higher interest
rates, which are always politically unpopular, as an instrument to constrain increases in
asset prices, which are generally popular.   Also, the central bank may be unable to
convincingly demonstrate, even ex post, that a policy tightening was necessary.  As Borio
and Lowe (2002) comment ‘It takes a brave central bank to raise interest rates in the
absence of obvious inflationary pressures’. Central bankers have worked hard in the last
two decades in the fight against inflation to win some measure of institutional legitimacy
and are worried about jeopardising it now.
The discussions at Reserve Bank of Australia conference (2003) provide a good
summary of the current state of the debate. Most participants agreed in principle with the
desirability of managing bubbles if possible, but were doubtful that there was sufficient
information on which to formulate policy in most cases The general consensus was close
to the position put earlier by  Stevens (2003, P.2 26):
 We don’t know enough about the behaviour of asset prices, much less
about their linkages to the economy through the financial sector, to
make forecasts with any confidence. Nor do we know much about how
the dynamics might respond to monetary policy ...
A case might be made on rare occasions, to adopt a policy of ‘least
regret’  so  far  as  asset  prices  are  concerned,  if  financial  and
macroeconomic stability were thought to be at risk. To do so would
probably require an acceptance of a longer time horizon for inflation
targets, and an acceptance of a bit more short-term deviation from the
central point of the target (original emphasis)
Pointedly, however, Stevens adds that...‘these issues remain unresolved among theorists
and practitioners of monetary policy’.  Greenspan is certainly not hopeful.  And when19
asked about what central bankers should do about asset inflation, the RBA’s Ian
Macfarlane, simply stated, ‘I don’t know the answer…that is a huge problem’ (author
interview, Sydney, November 2001).
This inconclusive conclusion reflects the air of artificiality about the entire debate.
Concerns about the dangers of asset price booms and debt deflation are complex and
wide-ranging, and cannot easily be fitted into an analytical framework based on a single
variable, such as a measure of inflation, or a policy framework that is implicitly based on
the efficient markets hypothesis or at least on the view that the task of allocating financial
assets is best handled by markets.
Prudential policy
At first sight the use of prudential policy to control asset price volatility, leaving
monetary policy focused on traditional inflation targets, seems to have considerable
promise. As Borio and Lowe (2002) note, this allocation of responsibility seems to meet
the Tinbergen criterion of assigning one instrument for each target.
This is, however, a misperception. In the policy framework arising from financial
liberalisation, the justification for prudential regulation is based on the principal–agent
problem that emerges when financial institutions manage the assets of depositors, or
other customers, who are not in a position to monitor their activities closely.
That is, prudential policy is oriented towards ensuring that individual financial
institutions act honestly and manage risk appropriately. The typical instruments used in
prudential regulation involve capital adequacy ratios and other measures of the riskiness
of an institution’s portfolio. These measures depend, almost inevitably, on market asset
values. Thus, prudential regulation, properly applied, can ensure that institutions do not
respond inappropriately to market signals, but cannot deal adequately with the problems
that arise when market prices are themselves distorted by bubbles or busts. The closest
approach to the problem is to examine the vulnerability of institutions to particular
changes in asset prices. The Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority has recently20
undertaken such an examination of Australian providers of finance for housing.
This point is put most clearly by Carmichael and Esho (2001). Responding to the
suggestion  of  Schwartz  (2001)  that  prudential  authorities  should  link  portfolio
composition to capital requirements or deposit premiums, thereby penalising banks that
lend on assets where prices are subject to bubbles, they argue (p. 16) that the proposed
policy:
requires regulators to form judgements about the optimal structure of the
real sector - an area in which their expertise would have to be questioned.
Second, it involves substituting the judgement of regulators for the
judgement of bank management - something that runs counter to the risk-
based philosophy that has been emerging in banking regulation in recent
decades ...
While we accept that shifts in portfolio composition can play an
important role in facilitating the development of asset price bubbles,
introducing a system of benchmark portfolio weights and penalising
deviations from those benchmarks would be an extremely costly and
inefficient way of dealing with the problem. It would also be a
retrograde step in the evolution of regulatory philosophy away from
directives that substitute the commercial judgements of regulators for
those of bank management. (emphasis added)
Implicitly, the modern framework of monetary policy relies on a threefold division
of  responsibility.  Central  banks,  using  short-term  interest  rates  as  their  primary
instrument, are responsible for stabilising the inflation rate at a low target level. Prudential
regulators are responsible for ensuring that individual financial institutions maintain an
appropriate balance of risk and reserves. The task of determining asset prices, or,
equivalently, the volume and allocation of aggregate investment, is left to capital markets.
An alternative analysis
As the discussion above indicates, the current policy debate on asset price bubbles21
has reached an unsatisfactory point. On the one hand, it is generally agreed that asset
price bubbles occur regularly and that the bursting of such bubbles often has significant
negative consequences for the financial system, the macroeconomy, and individual
investors. On the other hand, there are powerful objections to any plausible policy
response that might be considered within the current policy framework.
When this kind of policy dilemma emerges, it often reflects the existence of
inherent contradictions between the facts under consideration and the premises on which
institutional frameworks are founded. In the present case, it is not difficult to find such a
contradiction. As the discussion of Carmichael and Esho (2001) indicates, the current
framework for monetary policy is based on the efficient markets hypothesis or at least on
the view that the task of allocating financial assets is better handled by markets than by
regulators.
On the other hand, the central fact giving rise to the debate about asset prices and
bubbles is that the volatility of asset prices has increased in the period of financial
liberalization.  It  is  now  generally  conceded,  at  least  implicitly,  that  financial
liberalisation has produced greater volatility in asset prices and increased the extent to
which financial markets generate, rather than moderate, macroeconomic instability.
The view that asset prices bubbles are particularly associated with financial
liberalisation has been challenged by Carmichael and Esho (2001), who point to the
experience of Australia in the 1970s, when the activity of nonbank lenders allowed a
speculative boom despite tight controls on the activity of banks. But unwillingness to
extend regulation to nonbank financial institutions, symbolised by the failure to proclaim
the Financial Institutions Act 1974 represented a passive form of liberalisation and was
an important precursor of full-scale liberalisation.
In the light of the experience of the 1990s, and particularly the speculative bubble
that dominated the world’s most well-developed and sophisticated capital markets, few
economists  now  explicitly  endorse  the  strongest  forms  of  the  efficient  markets
hypothesis, in which markets always and everywhere make the best possible use of all22
available information. Even prominent defenders of the hypothesis such as Malkiel
(2003) now allow for occasional episodes of speculative mania such as the ‘dotcom’
bubble.
To the extent that the efficient markets hypothesis is violated, asset prices
generated by capital markets will deviate from the ‘fundamental’ values, that is, the
optimal estimates of value based on all available information. In a policy framework
where responsibility for asset price determination is left to markets, excess asset price
volatility is inevitable as is the occurrence of asset price bubbles.
With  the  arguable  exception  of  ‘jawboning’,  no  policy  response  aimed  at
controlling asset price volatility is consistent with the current policy framework. It is
necessary either to accept asset price volatility, including the occurrence of asset price
bubbles,  as  part  of  the  price  of  liberalisation,  or  to  reconsider  the  entire  policy
framework.  As argued here, any ‘half way house’ of attempting to use either monetary
or prudential policy to regulate the system at the margins confronts severe difficulties.
Financial repression?
If asset price bubbles are an inevitable consequence of financial liberalisation, it
seems likely that some measures of financial repression will be needed if the frequency
and severity of bubbles is to be reduced. To the extent that this represents a reversal of
the policy developments of the 1980s and 1990s, a return to more detailed and intrusive
regulation would indeed be a significant step.
Two elements stand out as potential responses to asset price boom.  The first is a
response to the observation that strong increases in asset prices are typically associated
with financial innovations. For example, the boom in ‘dotcom’ shares was facilitated by
the innovative use of stock options as a method of payment for executives and others.
Genuinely beneficial financial innovations may justify some increase in the values of
assets, by facilitating trade in those assets. However, there are also many examples,
dating back to the South Sea Bubble, of spurious financial innovations being used to23
justify speculative booms. During the postwar era, the structure of regulation specified
required holdings of particular financial assets for banks and other financial institutions.
Hence, there was a presumption against financial innovation. Most financial innovation
took  place  on  the  margin,  either  in  unregulated  financial  institutions,  or  by  the
exploitation of gaps in existing regulations. Over time, regulations were adjusted to
accommodate successful innovations, for example, by broadening the range of assets that
could be counted for particular purposes.
By contrast, in the era of deregulation, there is a presumption in favor of financial
innovation. In general, no process of regulatory approval is required before a new
financial  instrument  is  adopted.  Even  where  rules  are  applied,  as  in  the  case  of
accounting  standards,  there  is  a  general  presumption  in  favour  of  ‘creative’
interpretations that permit innovations in financing. In response to such failures as the
rise and fall of Enron, there has been some tightening of accounting and regulatory
standards. Thus far, however, there has been no fundamental change in prudential policy.
In the absence of a severe failure in the financial system of the United States, it seems
unlikely that ideas of a ‘new global financial architecture’ will ever be much more than
ideas.
In addition to restrictions on financial innovation, the central element of the postwar
policy of financial repression was that of ‘qualitative control’, that is, directions to financial
institutions to reduce lending to sectors seen as ‘overheated’ while maintaining or increasing
lending in other areas. Reliance on qualitative controls was a natural accompaniment to a
policy of fixing interest rates directly, rather than through open market operations or
management  of  a  particular  short-term  interest  rate  such  as  the  Federal  Funds  rate.
Qualitative controls implicitly set different interest rate ‘prices’ for different kinds of
investment. The proposals of Schwartz (2001) represent one way in which differential prices
could be introduced into the current policy framework based on separation of monetary and
prudential policy.  One way to proceed would be to more sharply define the system of deposit
protection provided by government.  Those financial institutions that chose to operate within
this system (most presumably) would, as a quid pro quo, be required to submit to qualitative24
controls regarding the composition of their loan portfolios, with a view to reducing credit
flows to 'overheated' sectors.
Concluding comments
Asset  price  volatility  is  an  inevitable  consequence  of  financial  market
liberalisation, and, in extreme cases, inevitably generates asset price bubbles, the bursting
of which imposes substantial economic and social costs.  This paper has argued that all
conceivable  policy  responses  within  the  existing  liberalised  financial  system  face
daunting levels of uncertainty and risk.   Borio and Lowe’s efforts to develop lead
indicators of financial instability are commendable but do not and perhaps cannot go far
enough in reducing the uncertainty confronting policy makers.   The calibration of
instruments, such as interest rates, in dealing with overheated asset markets is also highly
uncertain.   Both sets of problems constrain the options open to policy makers and
highlight the economic and political risks associated with policy adventurism, or worse
still, policy errors.  Hence, the catchword of even those who advocate monetary policy
responses to asset inflation is ‘judgement’ and   ‘caution’.   This suggests that policy
makers will remain nervously on the sidelines of financial market gyrations or at most
make small, tentative moves with interest rates in attempts to constrain markets, using a
modified inflation targeting framework as their rationale.  This has been stance of recent
monetary policy moves in Australia in the face of house price overheating.  This is a
‘subtle’ shift in policy, but as Greenspan points out above, there are few reasons so far to
believe that such shifts will do much to contain major bouts of asset inflation.
Given the pattern of increasing asset market volatility over recent decades
and the policy issues highlighted in this paper, the future looks uncertain.   Another
significant cycle of asset price movements, especially in one of the major economies,
could see a fundamental revision of thinking about the costs and benefits of liberalised
financial systems.  Arguably, the only alternative is a return to some degree of financial
repression.  As the Governor of the RBA, Ian Macfarlane (2001) observes:
I  think  the  really  fundamental  answer  is,  if  they  can’t  sort  them
[financial crises] out, then the only ultimate answer is some form of re-
regulation. I’m not for a minute thinking it’s going to happen in the25
next decade. But I would not rule out the possibility that in twenty-five
years, if we had a lot of bad experiences, and we go through another
cycle, we might seek some very clearly thought out regulations.26
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